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PRIVATE PROPERTY, DEVELOPMENT
AND FREEDOM: ON TAKING
OUR OWN ADVICE
Steven J. Eagle*
ABSTRACT
Adherence to the rule of law and respect for carefully delineated
property rights are necessary for economic development and human
freedom. This article analyzes efforts by United States governmental
agencies and private American institutes to convey this message to
Russia, other former Soviet Union republics, and former Soviet satellite states during the past fifteen years, and describes how these efforts
apparently have been met with some success. Finally, and unfortunately, this article examines how, here at home, the United States has
veered away from the very adherence to the rule of law respecting
property that it espouses abroad.

URING the past fifteen years, the United States government
and private American foundations have given considerable advice to the governments of Russia, other republics comprising
the former Soviet Union, and Eastern European nations emerging from
behind the former Iron Curtain. A good deal of this counsel reiterates
the theme that a robust set of private property rights in land is indispensable to individual freedom and economic prosperity. This article explores such suggestions by American governmental and private
organizations and contrasts them with contrary governmental practices
here in the United States.
As economic and foreign policy makers have discovered, meaningful
legal protection for private property cannot be imposed by sovereign fiat,
or imparted wholly through the generosity of eleemosynary foundations.
Instead, secure property rights arise as citizens come to enjoy the benefits
of private ownership and develop trust that their governments see such
rights as legitimate and inviolate. This, in turn, requires supportive legal
and social institutions.
In nations gaining a measure of political freedom, the immediate need
is for nurturing an institutional structure upon which property rights are
* Professor of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia
(seagle@gmu.edu). The author wishes to thank Bryan Kirchner, a third-year student at
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SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

based. In the United States, on the other hand, the need is to build upon
a long tradition of private property and freedom and to resist the temptation to achieve short-run governmental objectives at the cost of weakening individual rights.
I.

THE RULE OF LAW, PRIVATE PROPERTY,
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In developing and developed nations alike, the predicates for individual liberty and national wealth are the rule of law and private property
rights. The rule of law, in itself, is a necessary but insufficient condition
for either liberty or prosperity.
A. THE RULE OF LAW AS

A

FRAMEWORK FOR RIGHTS

The most essential aspect of the rule of law is that government is bound
in all its actions by rules determined and articulated in advance.' It thus is
distinguished from regimes in which the leader's whim must be obeyed.
While this other type of rule sometimes is characterized as "charismatic,"
history teaches that the better characterization is "despotic."'2 Among
the more specific attributes generally associated with the rule of law are
(1) capacity (rules must be able to guide people in their affairs); (2) efficacy (rules actually do serve to guide people); (3) stability (the rule must
be reasonably stable so that people can plan and coordinate their actions
over time); (4) supremacy of legal authority (the law should rule officials,
including judges, as well as ordinary citizens); and (5) impartiality (courts
3
should enforce the law and use fair procedures).
While the rule of law thus provides for procedural fairness and, at least
to some extent, shields individuals from abrupt changes in existing rules,
it does not necessarily establish norms for the substantive rules themselves. Indeed, there is a long history of debate about whether "law"
must be grounded in substantive norms at all. Those adhering to the positivist school of law maintain that the existence of "law" is not premised
on moral notions 4 and is nothing more than the authoritative proscription
1.

See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-73 (1944).

2. The "leader principle," in German, Fiihrerprinzip,was at the heart of Nazi rule.
"Nazi legal theory officially was that the Volk [people] defined the Fuhrer [leader], but the
practical power hierarchies fully contemplated by legal theorists writing after Hitler's
stranglehold on political power meant that the Fahrerwas to define the Volk, and not vice
versa." Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism:Indicationsfrom the FascistPeriod in
France and Germany of Judicial Methodology's Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL

IrN'L L.J. 101, 174 (2002). Recall also Lord Acton's admonition, "[p] ower tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell
Creighton (1887), available at http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/288200.html.
3. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997).
4. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155, 185, 201 (2d ed. 1999) (assert-

ing that legal positivism stands for "the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary
truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality").
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of the sovereign, the person habitually obeyed. 5 This perspective is open
to, among other criticisms, the inference that it lends legitimacy to tyrannical regimes. 6 Partly for this reason, those adhering to the natural law
school maintain that "law" must embody some minimal substantive con7
tent of fairness.

B.

POSITIvE LAW

APPROACHES

The rise of positivism can be traced to Thomas Hobbes's assertion that
the sole source of law is the absolute power of the sovereign. 8 As he
famously put it, the life of man in a state of nature was "solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short."9 Hobbes argued that men formed a social contract to establish order and safety and to escape the misery of the "war of
all against all." 10 Constrained by necessity, they entrusted their safety and
property to the sovereign's will.1"
Building upon Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham fashioned the theory of legal
positivism that the noted legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin has de12
scribed as the "ruling theory of law" in the United States and England.
Bentham adopted as his conceptual or structural component that "law"
comes from the sovereign,1 3 and as his substantive or normative component the utilitarian principle of obtaining the "greatest good for the greatest number. '14 In more recent times, two of the most prominent legal
positivists have been Hans Kelsen, who maintained that "a rule is a legal
rule because it provides for a sanction,"1 5 and H.L.A. Hart, who set forth
a nuanced theory of rules that govern conduct and rules that govern the
5.

See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED

193-94

(Isaiah Berlin et al., eds., Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1954) (1832) (noting that the maker of
"law" is the person whom the bulk of the population habitually obey and who habitually
obeys no one else).
6. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen's observation about the forced labor, concentration camps,
and murder authorized under the Nazi regime: "Such measures may morally be violently
condemned; but they cannot be considered as taking place outside the legal order ...
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 40 (Max Knight trans., 1967).
7. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (Jules Coleman & Scott Sha-

piro, eds., 2002).
8. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 80 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University Press
1991) (1651).
9. Id. at 89.
10. Id. at 96.
11. See generally id., pts. I, II.
12. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii, ix (1977).
13. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112 (C. K. Ogden ed., Richard
Hildreth trans., 1931).
I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as mine, except
through the promise of the law which guarantees it to me. It is the law alone
which permits me to forget my natural weakness. It is only through the protection of law that I am able to enclose a field, and to give myself up to its
cultivation with the sure though distant hope of harvest.
Id.

14.

JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-

ISLATION 2-3 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Methuen 1982) (1789).
15. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 29 (1961).
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creation and application of rules. 16
C.

NATURAL LAW APPROACHES AND LOCKE

Unlike legal positivism, the natural law approach to liberty and property is based on the supposition of moral reasoning. In 1980, Justice
Thurgood Marshall observed:
The constitutional terms "life, liberty, and property" do not derive
their meaning solely from the provisions of positive law. They have a
normative dimension as well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy which government is bound to respect. Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish
certain categories of common-law rights in some general way. Indeed, our cases demonstrate that there are limits on governmental
authority to abolish "core" common-law rights, including rights
against trespass, at least without a compelling showing
of necessity or
17
a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy.
Similarly, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Supreme Court, applied a natural law theory of property when he invoked "an essential
principle: Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property
rights."' 18
As distinguished from Hobbes's view that people had to entrust their
fate to the sovereign, John Locke liberalized the notion of social contract,
arguing that men had common sense and therefore could cooperate for
the common good without living under the yoke of absolutism. 19 Locke,
an English political philosopher, was the individual most influential in the
development of the American understanding of property rights. His labor theory of value often is called the "labor-desert" theory, since he asserts that individuals deserve to own, and can appropriate, natural
resources mixed with their own labor.
Locke's theory of appropriation is an element of a framework for understanding social relations in an era of poverty, as well as for action in
restructuring those relationships. 20 Using traditional natural law language, Locke asserted that everyone enjoys an "equal right" or "a right in
16. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (1961) (Hart describes
"law" as the union of primary rules (i.e., rules relating to conduct) and secondary rules
(i.e., rules which "specify the ways in which the primary rules [of conduct] may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined.")).
17. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
18. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61
'1993)(holding
that absent exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the Government give notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to its seizure
of real property subject to civil forfeiture).
19. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 267 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
20. See Richard Ashcraft, Lockean Ideas, Poverty, and the Development of Liberal Political Theory, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 43, 45 (John Brewer &
Susan Staves eds. 1995).
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common... [to] provide for their subsistence. '21 Thus, the law of nature
"gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep
him from extreme want, where he has no the means to subsist otherwise."' 22 Based on passages of the Two Treatises condemning nonproductive dominion over property as waste, 2 3 Richard Ashcraft concluded that
"[p]roductive labor, and not simply appropriation of property, is the key
concept in Locke's understanding of economic development
as well as an
24
element in his theologically structured political theory.
Locke saw the inherent liberties and rights of individuals as bound up
in the concept of property, which, in turn, was derived from the nature of
human personality itself. For Locke, the initial postulate was self-ownership: "Though the earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own person. ' 25 Locke admon'26
ished that "the preservation of Property" is the "end of Government.
In a recent case involving land use regulation, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the United States Supreme Court rejected a particularly stark assertion of legal positivism.

27

A combination of Rhode Island statutes and

environmental regulations precluded economically viable use of most of
the land subsequently acquired by the petitioner.2 8 The state asserted
that the very existence of these rules precluded the petitioner from raising
a takings claim. 29 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy declared that
"the State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
30
bundle."
D.

PROPERTY RIGHTS AS A FRAMEWORK
FOR LIBERTY AND PROSPERITY

The role of property rights in development efforts was noted by former
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, who described "the rule of
law, . . . property,..,

contract ....

and judicial review and determina-

21. LOCKE, supra note 19, at 204-10; id. at 286.
22. Id. at 271-79, 357-58, 381-82, 390-91; id. at 170.
23. Locke maintained that "God commended" man to labor, "to subdue the earth, i.e.,
improve it for the benefit of life," and that whoever "in obedience of this command of
God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it" could claim the land as the product of his
labor. Id. at 290-92. But if an individual fenced off land without cultivating or otherwise
improving it, the land, "notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste,
and might be the possession of any other." Id. at 295-96, 391-92.
24. Ashcraft, supra note 20, at 43, 45.
25. LOCKE, supra note 19, at 287.

26. Id. at 360-61 ("The Supreme Power cannot take from any Man any Part of his
Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires,
that the People should have Property.").
27. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
28. Id. at 626-27.
29. Id. at 626-27. For further explication, see Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings
Notice Rule, 24 U. HAw. L. REV. 533 (2002).
30. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
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tion" as "the essential infrastructure of a market economy. '3 1 International officials have espoused similar sentiments. Addressing the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan
declared that: "[w]ithout rules governing contracts and property rights;
without confidence based on the rule of law; without trust and transparency, there could be no well-functioning markets. '32 The Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus, similarly noted that "the rule of law and respect for property," along with "an
independent judiciary and court system that can enforce property rights,"
are "principles that can act as lodestars for all countries . . . .33
The antithesis of the society governed by the rule of law is the society
where everything is up for grabs. Herman Melville eloquently described
the difference in his epic novel Moby Dick,34 where he generalized the
distinction between "fast fish," specifically whales that had been
harpooned so as to belong to a particular ship, even if subsequently
adrift, and "loose fish," whales which were in their natural state or
harpooned in a manner not perfecting a claim. 35 The latter were available to be hunted by all.3 6 Melville analogized mortgaged land and serfs to
"fast fish," and the rights of man and the America before the arrival of
Columbus to "loose fish."'37 As has become only too clear from the Su-

preme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 38 even in a

society founded on the rule of law, judicial interpretations can put private
39
property up for grabs.

E.

PRIVATE PROPERTY, LIBERTY AND WEALTH CREATION

Douglass North defines social institutions as "the rules of the game in a
society or, more formally,... the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction. ' 40 The institution of private property is essential to
individual liberty, the strengthening of civic institutions, and wealth formation both in developed and in developing nations.
The benefit to society inuring from widespread ownership of property
has been asserted by such disparate groups as the Southern Agrarian
31. Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech to Woodrow Wilson
Center Award Dinner (June 6, 1997), quoted in 0. Lee Reed, Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in Property, Liberty, and Corporate Governance, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673,

713 (2003).
32. Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen., Address Before the United States Chamber of
Commerce (June 10, 1999), quoted in Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property:A Foundation for the Private Market and Business Study, 38 AM. Bus. L. 441, 442 (2001).
33. Michel Camdessus, Managing Dir., I.M.F., Remarks Before the Warsaw School of
Economics (Dec. 13, 1999), quoted in Reed, supra note 32, at 441-42.
34. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (1st ed. London) (1851).
35. Id at 331.
36. Id at 331.
37. Id at 331-34.
38. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).

39. See infra text accompanying notes 300-12.
40. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990).

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
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movement in the United States 4 1 and modern experimental economists
for a reconstituted civil society in Iraq. 42 For some, the primary benefit

of both property 43 and contract 44 is not maximization of wealth, but the
furtherance of liberty. F. A. Hayek has stated:
What our generation has forgotten is that the system of private property is the most important guaranty of freedom, not only for those
who own property, but scarcely less for those who do not. It is only
because the control of the means of production is divided among
many people acting independently that nobody has complete power
over us, 45that we as individuals can decide what to do with
ourselves.
A strong property rights regime is an essential element for strong economic growth and wealth creation. Property rights help nurture in individual citizens a sense of personal responsibility, since the costs for failing
to act as good stewards does not fall upon society as a whole, but rather
redounds to the detriment of the individual owner. 4 6 Beyond benefits to
the individual, a strong property rights regime can even create incentives
for individuals to create institutions of social protection. 4 7 Homeowners,
for instance, have an enduring financial bond to their communities that
tenants do not. They therefore tend to support local amenities that add
to resale value, such as good schools, even when they make no personal

41. See, e.g., M. E.

BRADFORD, REMEMBERING WHO WE ARE: OBSERVATIONS OF A

86 (1985) (asserting that individual property ownership is vital
to a culture of family self-reliance and liberty and that, for that reason, government should
help individuals acquire property if necessary).
42. Vernon L. Smith, The Iraqi People's Fund, WALL ST. J. Dec. 22, 2003, at A14.
SOUTHERN CONSERVATIVE

43. See, e.g., WALTER LIPPMANN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM 100-102 (1934).
[T]he only dependable foundation of personal liberty is the personal economic security of private property .... There is no surer way to give men the
courage to be free than to insure them a competence upon which they can
rely. Men cannot be made free by laws unless they are in fact free because
no man can buy and no man can coerce them. That is why the Englishman's
belief that his home is his castle and that the king cannot enter it ... [is] the
very essence of the free man's way of life.
Id., quoted in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
44. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997). Bainbridge notes that, for mainstream contractarians, private ordering is presumptively legitimate because it is efficient. "For conservative contractarians, this is precisely backwards:
we regard efficiency as a presumptively legitimate norm precisely because it best serves our
preference for private ordering through contract." Id. at 904 n.199.
45. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 103-104.
46. See, e.g., Alan Rufus Waters, Economic Growth and the Property Rights Regime, 7
CATO J. 99, 104-105 (1987); see also Robert D. Cooter, Organization as Property: Economic Analysis of Property Law Applied to Privatization,in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET
ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 77, 82 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C. Rausser, eds.
1992).

47. See Waters, supra note 46, at 108-09; see also MANCUR

OLSON, POWER AND PROS-

PERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS

103-04 (2000).
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use of them. 48 Likewise, the prevention of theft is of interest to all property owners. 49 Therefore, not only do property owners take steps to protect their property, but they also assist in law enforcement because it is in
their interest to do so. 50 The rule of law as a whole is strengthened by
this private interest. 5 1 Paradoxically, collectivism strips the individual of
responsibility for adverse events and thus any reason to work for the col52
lective benefit.
To help create these incentives to work for individual gain and the collective good, governments must enforce a system of property rights that
(1) are perceived to be permanent, (2) include the exclusive right of individuals to use their resources as they see fit, and (3) include the exclusive
right to voluntarily transfer or partition their rights.5 3 Permanency of the
property rights gives individuals the confidence and security to use the
land because they have assurance that they will reap the benefits of their
labor. A government's effective recognition of property
rights is essential
54
for allowing individuals to rely on those rights.
Beneficial property rights regimes begin with a strong and clear land
code. The land code should encompass three fundamental objectives:
"(a) achieving land tenure security for private landholders; (b) developing a market in land rights; and (c) defining and protecting remaining
'55
legitimate public interests.
Land tenure security, [the primary goal of any land code,] exists
when an individual perceives that he or she has the right to a piece of
land on a continuous basis, free from imposition or interference from
outside sources, as well as the ability to reap the benefits of labor
and capital invested
in the land, whether in use or upon transfer to
56
another holder.
The establishment of a regime of land and other property rights is
rarely performed on a clean slate. The existing set of property rights
vested in private individuals and firms and communal and state organizations must be accounted for as part of any effort to build a strong economy based on private property. The heart of the reform must therefore
be in the legal system. Individuals working to grow their assets must be
supported by clear laws defining their property rights. 57 These laws, in
48. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE
POLICIES (2001).

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See OLSON, supra note 47, at 103-04.
52. Waters. supra note 46, at 108-09.
53. Id. at 104-05; Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. & Lee Hoskins, PropertyRights: The Key to
Economic Development, 482 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 8-9 (2003).
54. Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1741-42 (2002).
55. Dana Tumenova, Evolution of Land Reform in Russia: The 2001 Land Code and
Its Impact on the Commercial Real Estate Market and Direct Foreign Investment, 11 PAC.
RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 769, 789 (2002).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 789-90.
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turn, must be enforced by a judiciary that resolves disputes swiftly and
fairly.5 8 Processes for establishing and recording property rights must be
well thought out and streamlined so that the rights are established as
59
quickly and at the lowest cost possible.
II.
A.

ADVISING EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS

GENERAL ADVICE FROM AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCIES

The collapse of Soviet influence over Eastern Europe during the late
1980s and early 1990s provided a unique opportunity for privatization advocates to test their theories of economic growth. Eager to facilitate market economies and democracy, private American organizations and the
United States Government offered advice and support to these countries.
The goal was to build market-based, democratic societies grounded in the
rule of law and private property.
1. Advice from Private American Institutions
There has been widespread agreement among economists and other
scholars on the fundamental tasks necessary for a successful transition
from a socialist to a free market economy. However, there has not been
a similar consensus on the manner and timing in which some of these
steps are to be implemented. The agreed upon tasks can be grouped into
four broad categories: (1) institutional reform; (2) enterprise reform and
structuring; (3) price and market reform; and (4) macroeconomic stabilization. 60 Western governments can best assist in this process through financial and technical assistance and by providing access to their markets.
61
This article discusses the first two tasks.
Institutional reform can be understood as the redefinition of the role of
the state from controlling the economy to a government of institutions
that facilitate a strong free market economy. Necessary elements include
legal and regulatory reform, the development of a basic social safety net,
and the reform of government institutions involved in activities such as
tax administration and monetary control. Institutions include a diverse
collection of socially developed constraints, such as regulatory bodies or
sets of rules within such organization, on individual action. 62 Such institutions generally should function in support of the market as opposed to
controlling it. A society with well functioning supporting institutions al58. Id.; see Cross, supra note 54, at 1742.
59. Waters, supra note 46, at 112.
60. Lawrence Summers, The Next Decade in Central and Eastern Europe, in THE
EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 46, at 23, 32.

61. The third task, price and market reform, includes removing price controls, liberalizing trade, and creating competitive factor markets. The final task, macroeconomic stabilization, focuses on tightening fiscal and credit policies and addressing internal and
external imbalances. Id. at 32.
62. William E. Kovacic, InstitutionalFoundationsfor Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 265, 271 (2001).
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lows individuals to enter into a multitude of complex agreements. 63 Conversely, in a country without supporting institutions, individuals struggle
to enforce their rights and64shy away from interacting with other entities in
mutually beneficial ways.
Among the most important reforms of government institutions is the
establishment of an independent and well-functioning judiciary to resolve
property disputes and enforce property rights.65 This most likely will result in decisions that promote economic efficiency and therefore lead to
wealth enhancement, 66 as in the common law tradition. 67 Although private parties can rely on market enforcement mechanisms and other nonjudicial dispute resolution methods to
some extent, in the long run weak
68
courts will seriously restrict growth.
In addition to a strong judiciary, scholars largely agree upon the necessity of regulatory bodies that interpret and administer the law and possess
appropriate market oversight responsibilities. For instance, an antitrust
agency would help prevent collusion, predatory pricing, and other abusive practices. Antitrust regulation is particularly important to development of a strong competitive market in Eastern Europe because prior
regimes stressed centrally planned economies and regarded competition
as wasteful. 69 Trade policy, securities, banking regulation, tax policy, and
a social safety net should be administered through the government in a
way that supports and is beneficial to the market. 70 Organized and run
properly, these bodies will help develop a strong and secure market.
However, such agencies should be fully aware of the possibility of and be
careful to avoid overextending
their regulatory reach and consequently
71
retarding market growth.
Rounding out a market-supportive infrastructure, such entities as universities and professional schools and organizations would assist in developing the expertise necessary for intelligent and uniform application of
the law. 72 In particular, judges need to be able to understand the complex deals that an open market produces and the consequences of their
decisions in order to administer the law efficiently. 73 Similarly, regulators
63.

Christopher Clague et al., Institutions and Economic Performance:Property Rights

and Contract Enforcement, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH
AND GOVERNANCE IN LESS-DEVELOPED AND POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 67, 68 (Christo-

pher Clague, ed. 1997).
64. Id.
65. Kovacic, supra note 62, at 271.
66. Cooter, supra note 46, at 77, 97.
67. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).

68. Kovacic, supra note 62, at 271.
69. Robert D. Willig, Anti-Monopoly Policies and Institutions, in THE EMERGENCE OF
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 46, at 187, 188-89.

70. Christopher Clague, The Journey to a Market Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 46, at 1, 16-17.

71.

Willig, supra note 69, at 195.

72. Kovacic, supra note 62, at 272-73.
73. Id. at 273-74.
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need to be able to understand the markets they are regulating in order to
74
facilitate strong growth while avoiding overregulation.
A general land use framework, with administration delegated to local
government, could support economic growth when tailored to local traditions and, in general, offers wide discretion to market forces while allowing for a system of dispute resolution. 75 The key, however, is clearly
defined procedures for obtaining necessary permits and enforcing
rights. 76 Without clear procedural guidelines, the process would be extremely inefficient. 77 Conversely, clear procedural guidelines and limited
involvement will allow the market to grow and allocate land resources
efficiently.
Legislative action and administrative interpretation must support private property rights and market activities. Economists have suggested
narrow, general, and easily implemented legislation, permitting room for
legal interpretations that will mould the law to efficiently work with the
market. 78 However, the reason for this also lies in the nature of the political process. Legislative reform requires the support of the population,
which may be too fickle to support reforms over a long period of time.
Scholars agree that the absolutely necessary legislation should be passed
while the population is still energized by the prospect of market reforms. 79 This political consideration played a big role in the division
80
among scholars over the timing of privatization.
a.

Enterprise Reform

"Enterprise reform" may be defined as the development of a private
sector through the establishment of well defined property rights, the restructuring of enterprises, and the facilitation of the entry and exit of
firms. The timing of privatization efforts in a developing economy remains an issue:
In retrospect, there is widespread agreement on the importance of
institutional reform to successful transition. In an ideal world, these
reforms should precede or at least accompany enterprise privatization. But in a less than ideal world, there is no consensus on how
much institutional reform was feasible in Russia during the 1990s,
nor on whether rapid enterprise privatization, despite weak institutions, was better than available alternatives. Gradualist authors, who
include both economists and political scientists, believe that the Russian government could have done significantly better at institutional
reform, if President Yeltsin had made this reform a political
74. See generally Clague, supra note 70, at 17.
75. Cheryl W. Gray et al., Hungarian Legal Reform for the Private Sector, 26 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 293, 315 (1992).

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Cooter, supra note 46, at 96.
79. Id.; see Clague, supra note 70, at 21.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
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priority. 81
There is general agreement that the process of reforming property
rights should take into account each nation's traditions and the nature of
its current law. The property rights regimes in Eastern Europe are not
being established in a vacuum. For example, in Russia, property rights
are being layered on top of Soviet collectivism and pre-Soviet civil law. 82
The Czech Republic has a history where land ownership was recognized
but was rendered largely meaningless because the state retained the right
to use the land. 83 The right to own land was not a foreign concept and

was accomplished without much difficulty, but rights of exclusion and use
needed to be developed largely from scratch. 84 A property rights system
also must account for the agrarian, industrial, or mixed nature of the
85
country as the system is introduced.
A property rights system must also be able to facilitate change in land
usage and industrial structure. Entry and exit of firms and individuals
creates efficient land use and corporate structure. Property rights regimes that prescribed certain land uses and corporate forms should be
discouraged. Instead, a private property rights regime is beneficial if it
provides a framework for competition among alternative uses.8 6 The key
is transferability. Property rights must easily be exchangeable to allow
property to migrate to its most efficient use. Otherwise, property use will
remain inefficient, and the market will not be allowed to grow.8 7
Of course, antecedent to efficient transfer between private individuals,
land, other natural resources, and enterprises must be transferred from
the state to private ownership. Auctions and "spontaneous privatizations" appear to be the preferred methods for such transfers because both
seem to be the most efficient option in most situations. "Spontaneous
privatization" involves a "sweetheart" sale of an enterprise to the existing
management. 88 This process, although not the most equitable, places the
enterprise in the hands of managers who will either be able to adapt it for
efficient use or realize its sale value. Also, it would tend to keep the vast
majority of a country's enterprises out of the hands of cash rich foreigners, at least temporarily. 89
81.

Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, InstitutionalReform in Transition:A Case

Study of Russia, 10 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 220 (2003).

82. Gianmaria Ajani & Ugo Mattei, Codifying Property Law in the Process of Transition: Some Suggestions from Comparative Law and Economics, 19 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 117, 118 (1995).

83. Donovan W. Burke, Argument for the Allocation of Resources to the Development
of a Well-Defined System of Real Property Law in the Czech Republic, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 661, 682 (1996).
84. Id. at 683.
85. Id.; Ajani & Mattel, supra note 82, at 126-27.
86. Cooter, supra note 46, at 97.
87. See generally id.
88. See, Stanley Fischer, Privatizationin East European Transformation,in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 46, at 227, 231-33.
89. Cooter, supra note 46, at 93.
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A flexible system that facilitates the mobility of private industry must
have a functioning private housing ownership and rental market. Industry cannot prosper with an immobile labor force resulting from insufficient housing. 90 However, privatizing housing is one of the more difficult
aspects of an overall privatization program. 91 The sale of housing to nonresidents would create conflict with the current residents. Furthermore,
even if preferred access to housing is given to local residents, housing
92
prices will probably rise.
Hungary's solution to this problem was nationalizing the property and
compensating the former owners with lump sum coupons reflecting the
value of the property. 93 These coupons could then be used as full or partial payment for property undergoing privatization. 94 The main success
of this program was the avoidance of clouded titles. 95 Clear title was seen
as a main goal in the privatization of housing along with the facilitation of
sales and construction. 96 Advice, therefore, focused on assessing the viability of and providing technical advice for the development of certain
vital pieces of a housing market, such as a construction sector and mortgage lending facilities. 97 By establishing new housing, driven by demand
and supported by appropriate government institutions, the housing market should gradually become privatized. 98
Privatization is unquestionably the linchpin of reform recommendations for Eastern Europe. Private ownership of land and enterprises will
give individuals incentives to use the land for its most efficient purpose or
to sell the land to someone who will do so. Either way, the property will
gravitate towards its most efficient use in the society. The viability of the
privatization process and whether it produces long term economic
growth, however, appears to depend largely on the timing of the
privatization.
b.

Reform Timing

The early dispute among scholars focused on the timing and on the
implementation of the reform steps. 99 Initially, much of the private university and think tank advice focused on state organized mass privatiza90. Thomas Gale Moore, Privatization in the Former Soviet Empire, in
TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM

ECONOMIC

180 (Edward P.

Lazear, ed., 1995).
91. Id.; see also Fischer, supra note 88, at 242.
92. Moore, supra note 90, at 180.
93. Gray et al., supra note 75, at 308-09.
94. Id. at 309.
95. Id. at 310.
96. Id. at 312-13; see also Ted K. Smith, The Foreign Investment Regime of the Russian
Federation:Progress Toward a System of Free Entry, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 310, 323-25
(1993).
97. Gray et al., supra note 75, at 312-13.
98. See Smith, supra note 96, at 323-25.
99. Edward P. Luzear, Economic Reform: Appropriate Steps and Actual Policies, in
ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA:

note 90, at 15.
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tion. 10 0 The so called "Big Bang" or "Shock Therapy" method is
privatization carried out at once and on a mass scale under the direction
of the national government. In other words, enterprise reform was to
come first and fast.10 1 Conversely, voluntary or "ad hoc" privatization
carried out one enterprise at a time over a long period of time was advocated by other scholars who believed that institutional reform had to be
in place before a predominantly private economy could thrive.1 0 2
Advocates of shock therapy supported it because they believed that
privatization had to be carried out while the population still supported
it.103 Slow privatization during a period of institutional reform, conversely, was thought to allow managers to strip company assets and to
allow workers and managers to collude to raise wages. 104 Such activity, it
was feared, would give the public the impression that privatization does
not work. 10 5 Rapid massive reforms would create property owners and
demonstrate the benefits of privatization before any opponents could act
to derail the reforms.
For example, Harvard University's Jeffery D. Sachs urged Russia to
rapidly adopt reforms that comprehensively addressed and installed a private ownership system. 10 6 Sachs believed that Russian privatization
would work best if the national Russian government enacted reforms that
privatized thousands of the larger industrial enterprises, simultaneously
transferring them into joint stock companies with share distribution reflecting the current balance of interest in the enterprises. 10 7 The federal
Russian government would maintain ownership of a minority of shares
and then distribute them over the course of several years.1 08 For medium
and small sized shops, Sachs recommended that Russia follow Eastern
Europe's example and orchestrate worker-management buyouts. 10 9 Finally, he advocated auctions for ownership of retail shops. 110 A few years
later, Sachs was holding up Russia as an example that mass, rapid privatization was the right course for economic growth."' Failing to privatize
100. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Privatizationin Russia: Some Lessons from Eastern Europe,
82 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 43-44 (1992); see also Armeane M. Choksi et al., The Design of

Successful Trade LiberalizationPolicies, in

FOREIGN ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION

37 (An-

dres Koves & Paul Marer eds., West View Press 1991); Lazear, supra note 99, at 15-16;
ANDERS ASLUND, BUILDING CAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC 76 (Cambridge University Press 2002).

101. Sachs, supra note 100, at 43-44.
102. See Paul H. Brietzke, Designing the Legal Frameworksfor Markets in Eastern Europe, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 35, 41-42 (1994); see also Charles Cadwell, Implementing Legal
Reform in Transition Economies, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN LESS-DEVELOPED POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, supra
note 63, at 266-67; ASLUND, supra note 100, at 100-02.
103. Sachs, supra note 100, at 43-44.
104. Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.

111. Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Transition at Mid Decade, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 128 (1996).
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rapidly, Sachs believed, would result in the holding up or even sabotage
of political reform by former bureaucrats.1 2 The government must take
the opportunity to privatize and demonstrate the benefits of a free market system while they have the chance. 1 3 By creating property owners as
soon as possible, rapid privatization would install a middle class with a
stake in the effective maintenance of property rights and the pursuit of
114
governmental policies that further support the private sector.
Some scholars criticized the shock therapy concept at the time, and it
came under even more criticism for placing the onus on rapid enterprise
reform by the state instead of allowing property rights to form and develop at the local level with government institutional support. The scholars believed that property rights in the context of a modern society are
too complex and individualized to simply be installed for the development of a market economy. 115 Although basic legal protections, such as
the right to a home, are simple to identify and protect, many property
rights are not as easy to identify prior to development.' 1 6 In these situa117
tions, the law must work with industry rules of practice and custom.
In Eastern Europe, the industrialization from the communist era necessitated the creation of property rights beyond simple rules." 8 In this context, property rights must be allowed to develop in response to market
demand, as opposed to being installed as a precondition to a market
economy.11 9 State imposed property rights might impede market development instead of reinforcing and working in connection with self-enforcing market mechanisms.' 20 Laws form an important part of the
establishment of a strong property rights regime, but they must function
with market forces to be truly effective in supporting a vibrant
12 1
economy.
Many commentators assert that private enterprises work well only after
a society has established the institutions that interact with the market to
form an efficient private sector. This is the role meant for government
involvement during the early stages. A set of new rules should be established to inspire confidence in would be private investors. Of primary
importance is the establishment of a legal infrastructure for the private
sector, including commercial and contract law, anti-trust and labor law,
rules regarding foreign ownership of companies, laws relating to the
transfer of property, and laws affecting landlord-tenant relations and cre112. Id. at 129.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 132-33.
115. See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87, 89-90 (1996); Brietzke, supra note 102, at 41-42;
see also ASLUND, supra note 100, at 100.
116. Rapaczynski, supra note 115, at 89.
117. Id. at 89-90.

118. Id. at 91.
119. Id. at 102.
120. Id.
121. Id.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

ating systems for recording and transferring such rights. In addition, all
these measures are of little practical value, unless the laws are supported
by courts and trained professionals, who can settle disputes and enforce
the laws. 122 These reforms must precede major privatization efforts to
avoid mass disorder and lawlessness in the process.
More recent analysis of these early attempts demonstrates that the advocates of beginning the process with the development of government
supporting institutions were correct and that these institutions were
largely overlooked as a vital factor for successful rapid privatization by
advocates of the "big-bang" theory. 12 3 In Russia, for instance, mass
privatization was conducted in a society with little history involving such
government institutions. 124 This privatization was, therefore, largely conducted in a void.1 25 Prosperity did not follow because the institutions
supporting the property rights were virtually non-existent. 126 The Russian mob stepped into this void, offering property owners "protection" at
1 27
a price.
Conversely, in both the Czech Republic and Poland, privatization has
been relatively successful. 128 In the Czech Republic, the new government
was able to reinstitute much of the pre-communist revolution law with
modifications reflecting the desired changes to the law and property
rights structure. 129 The privatization was able to rest on old traditions
130
and a legal framework that once helped that country's markets grow.
In Poland, the background reforms that were beginning as far back as
1981 allowed for a more rapid transition to a private economy in the early
1990s.13 1 The pace of privatization can be rapid if the individual country's traditions and history so allow, but such privatization should not begin until the appropriate government institutions for protecting individual
property rights are in place.
As reflected in a report issued by the World Bank, private and governmental development institutions have come to recognize that "if the transition economies are to join the ranks of the advanced market economies,
they will need not just good economic policies but strong and accountable
122. See Clague, supra note 70, at 1, 5.
123. See David Lipton & Jeffery Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of
Poland,2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 293, 327-32 (1990) (acknowledging
the role of socialist reforms of the 1980s, but disregarding their importance in the relatively
successful Polish privatization program).
124. Douglass C. North, Why Some Countries Are Rich and Some Are Poor, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 319, 326-28 (2001).
125. Id. at 327.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also 0. Lee Reed, Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in Property, Liberty,
and CorporateGovernance, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673, 712-13 (2003) (discussing the
consequences of the Russian privatization measures on Russian industrial management).
128. North, supra note 124, at 328; Lipton & Sachs, supra note 123, at 303.
129. North, supra note 124, at 328.
130. Id.
131. Lipton & Sachs, supra note 123, at 303-04.
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institutions to support

them.

' 132

The focus has shifted to "securing
the economic and social fundamentals" and "reinvigorating institutional
capability."' 133 In the final analysis, it may be faster to just create private
property in name; the more difficult task of creating a property legal
structure to enforce these rights in practice with regard to the equal exclusionary rights of others is the essential first step to successfully creating
market growth in a society. 13 4 Eventually, private assets tend to end up
in the possession of those who most value them regardless of the method
of privatization used. Nevertheless, the speed with which a country can
develop the necessary supporting institutions and progress towards privatization of its society on any sort of a mass scale is dependent upon a
135
country's traditions and the institutions already in place.
2.

. .

United States Government Advice and Assistance

Since the waning of the Soviet Union's influence, many Eastern European countries have invited the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist in their efforts to transition from a centrally
planned economy to a market economy. Upon these invitations, USAID
established missions dedicated to the task of assisting in the development
of each country. These missions do not fund or perform self-contained
activities aimed at changing a country's economic system. 136 Instead,
USAID assists the country's reformers in weighing options, refining technical solutions, and helping to build analytic capacity to implement and
137
manage reforms in accordance with the mission's strategic objectives.
Over the course of the early 1990s many countries turned to USAID for
help in creating an economy based on private ownership. 138 USAID also
contracts out and awards grants to private institutions based on their assessment of a country's need. With a few exceptions, USAID will solicit
139
bids for projects and select from among the competitors.
The first task in developing a USAID mission to a country is determining a set of strategic objectives that focus the issues for which the country
requested help. Generally, USAID's strategic objectives for Eastern European countries included accelerated development and growth of pri132. David Campbell, Breach and Penalty as ContractualNorm and ContractualAnomie, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 681, 686 (2001) (quoting THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET).

133. Id.
134. See Reed, supra note 127, at 711.
135. North, supra note 124, at 326-27.
136. See USAID, USAID RUSSIA MISSION, http://www.usaid.ru/en/main/activity/index.
shtml?activity-id=644 (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
137. Id.
138. USAID, EUROPE AND EURASIA: REGIONAL MAP AND COUNTRY LINKS, http://
www.usaid.gov/locations/europeeurasia/countries/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
139. See USAID RUSSIA MISSION/How WE OPERATE?, http://www.usaid.ru/en/procurement/howwe-operate.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
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vate enterprises.1 40 The objectives also called for more effective,
responsive, and accountable local governments. 14 1 USAID support, accordingly, has focused on the creation of a property rights system that142
is
supported by strong laws and allowed to develop via the market.
Therefore, much of the work has been advice and technical support for
1 43
the formation of property rights legislation and recordation systems.
Although officials recognized that advice needed to be tailored to the
specific country's customs and traditions, there are several common
themes that can be found in the advice given and supported by the
United States government. For example, United States officials focused
their efforts on providing what they called "demand-driven technical assistance." 144 This means that they wanted to provide advice in response
to requests from organizations within the country instead of attempting
to impose a preconceived program. 145 This policy reflects the acknowledgement that reforms are most effective in situations where the market
is ready for them and where the reforms account for and reflect the market realities of the specific region.
Towards this end, another focus of USAID and its contractors was to
train local officials in carrying out the necessary acts for implementing
and maintaining private land reform policies in their region. 146 In addition, the systems created were drawn up to be clear and concise. 147 The
idea was to facilitate the transition to a private property regime in a manner as unobtrusive as possible with the lives of the local residents.' 48 The
simpler and more cost effective the process of privatization and local administration of the system, the easier it is to get local people and firms to
participate in it and to rely upon it. To support all of this work at the
local level, the efforts at the level of national government focused on legal reform and assistance in drawing up and enacting legislation. This
framework supported the local programs by providing a background that
ensured that property rights would be upheld in the face of local corruption and gave local authorities the backbone upon which to build reforms.
All these actions reflect a belief that land reform is most effectively
enacted when reforms are allowed to form in accordance with local markets based on a national legal framework. Conversely, reforms carried
140. KENNETH J. KOPSTEIN ET AL., EVALUTION REPORT: THE RUSSIAN HOUSING SECTOR REFORM PROJECT PHASES I AND II 14 (The Office of Program and Policy Develop-

ment, USAID Mission to Russia Nov. 1999).
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id. at 14-15.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g.,
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FROM 1990-2000 42-45 (Mgmt. Sys. Int'l 2000).

A

HISTORY AND

IN

ASSESSMENT

145. Id.

146. Id. at 26-27.
147. See, e.g., David Arsenashvili, Land Privatizationin Georgia,in COUNTRY STUDIES:
REAL ESTATE PRIVATIZATION IN SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN COUNTRIES 2 (2001).
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out directly on a national scale can incapacitate economic progress by
contradicting the realities of local markets. Land reform at the national
level should leave a flexibility that allows local officials and the market
itself to flourish and work in conjunction with a strong property rights
regime.
B.

NATION-SPECIFIC REFORM EFFORTS

Over the past fifteen years, many of these general concepts have been
tested in the Eastern European countries. USAID and private American
institutions have been in these countries continually offering advice and
helping implement their recommendations. This section explores these
efforts in several of the numerous countries trying to privatize their
economies.
1.

Russia

In the early 1990s, the Russian Federation began the process of reversing the state ownership of land system that had been instituted after the
Soviet Revolution of 1917.149 As with other countries, Russian history
and traditions in land tenure were an important consideration in adapting
general concepts of privatization to the Russian Federation. 150
a.

Land Ownership

The state monopoly on land ownership in the Russian Federation was
first broken by the passage of the Law on Land Reform (November 23,
1990) and the Law on Property (December 24, 1990).151 The Law on
Property provided that parcels of land could be held privately by individuals and entities as well as by the state. 152 These principles were later
153
affirmed in the constitution of the Russian Federation.
To support these principles of land ownership, the Civil Code of the
Russian Federation defines private property rights. Article 209, The Content of Property Rights of the Code provides that:
1. The owner possesses the rights to hold, to use, and to dispose of
his property.
2. The owner at his own pleasure may take any actions with respect
to the property in his possession as long as they do not conflict with
laws and other legal acts and do not harm the rights and interests of
other persons as they are protected by the law; he (the owner) may
alienate his own property as property to other persons or transfer to
them rights to hold and to use and to dispose of the property while
149.

See Alexey Overchuk, Development of Private Landownership in Russia, in COUN-

TRY STUDIES: REAL ESTATE PRIVATIZATION IN SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN COUNTRIES, supra note 147, at 1.
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remaining its owner, or to use the property as collateral or to exchange in any way or to dispose of it in any other way.
3. Holding, use, and disposal of land and other natural resources is
carried out freely by the owner to the extent their transfer is allowed
by law (Article 129) and as long as it does not harm the environment
and lawful interests of other persons.
4. The owner may transfer his property into trust management to
another person (trust administrator). The transfer of property into
trust management does not consequently effect [sic] the transfer of
ownership rights to the trust administrator who must manage the
property in the54interests of the owner or other persons as requested
by the owner.'
The Code goes on to define the means of acquiring, inheriting, confiscating, transferring, and terminating ownership rights in immovable property (i.e., land parcels and everything tightly attached to the land so that
its movement is impossible without causing considerable damage). 155 In
156
general, the transfer of land is carried out on a contract basis.
b. Housing
The Russian government also tried to privatize housing in the early
days of the Russian Federation.' 57 Initially, the government tried to
privatize housing by selling units at low cost. 158 This effort met with little
initial success, since only about 8.2% of Russian housing had been transferred to private ownership by the time USAID became involved in
1992.159
As USAID became involved, the Russian government began taking
new measures to transfer housing to private ownership. 160 USAID's involvement in the project was spearheaded by the Urban Institute and
consisted of several elements.1 61 First, the project strategy called for the
design and implementation of demonstration projects to prove that a particular housing reform could be developed in Russia.162 USAID then focused on assisting in the legal reforms necessary for the implementation
of the housing reforms. 163 USAID also promised technical assistance on
the demand driven housing projects undertaken by individual Russian cit164
ies and agencies.
Possibly the most critical aspect of housing reform was the development of appropriate policies and legislation that supported all the func154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 4-5.
156. Id. at 5.
157. KOPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 6.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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tional activities of housing reform. 165 Over the eight years of the project,
the project staff assisted in over 160 federal laws, executive orders, and
regulations. 166 The December 1992 Law of Fundamentals of Federal
Housing Policy allowed the implementation of the housing reform activities advocated by USAID. 167 Laws were later passed on such key aspects
as Mortgages and the Recording of Real Estate Rights. 168 These legal
long way towards the establishment of a
reforms have brought Russia a 169
free market system of housing.
The major legal reforms on housing between 1992 and 1995 included
the elaboration and adoption of the laws "On Fundamentals of Federal
Housing Policy," "On Privatization of the Housing Stock in the Russian
Federation," and the first part of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. 170 These acts provided the legal basis for the establishment of privately owned housing. 171 This legislative foundation was then
supplemented by numerous later acts, including acts that established a
system and establishing legal relations for
real estate rights 1registration
72
mortgage lending.
c.

Results and Recent Measures

The success for these early efforts was limited at best. The initial focus
on agrarian land and the later efforts on urban areas resulted in only
about 7.6% of the land in the country being owned by legal entities and
private citizens by the year 2000.173 Due to the vast open spaces of the
Russian Federation, this figure is deceptively small but is also hardly an
Much of the land is simply undesirindicator of an unqualified17success.
4
able to potential investors.
One of the main problems, however, was that much of the land was
unavailable for sale due to conflicting legislative constraints. 175 For example, more than two-thirds of agricultural land is either protected by
law or is unattractive to potential investors. 176 Significant pieces of these
lands cannot be transferred to the private sector because they are used
for transportation, broadcasting, defense, security, the space program, or
for housing urban land is simiprotected wildlife areas. 177 The situation
17 8
larly constrained by these factors.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Id. at 18.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 19.
169. Id.
170. RAYMOND J. STRUYK, HOUSING SECTOR
(The Urban Institute 1998).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 23-24.
173. Overchuk, supra note 149, at 12.
174. Id. at 15.
175. Id. at 14.
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177. Id.
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The Land Code passed in 2001 provides important steps towards a
framework for land ownership, but the limited reach of these laws also
reflects a continued political opposition to strong property rights. 179 The
Land Code represents, in part, a response to the need for clearly defined
and enforceable property rights in Russia. Up to this point, commercial
real estate development had been hampered by a process by which land
regulation had been left up to the decree of the president or regional
governors.' 8 0 The 2001 Code recognizes that strong predictable land
rights spur investment (both foreign and domestic) and consequently progress by providing investors with a dependable assurance of their
rights. 181 For example, prior Russian laws providing for only incomplete
182
ownership of land by foreign companies limited foreign investment.
Until Russia establishes dependable property rights, foreign investment
183
might be minimal.
2. Poland
The principal goal of the USAID housing strategy for Poland was "the
emergence of a competitive, modern, market-based housing finance and
production system."'184 Early efforts focused on assessing the viability
and providing technical advice for the development of certain vital pieces
of a housing market, such as a construction sector and mortgage lending
facilities. 185 Assistance in building and mortgage lending were accompanied by policy assistance. 186 Among other legislative assistance, USAID
had major input in the 1997 Mortgage Banking Law, the Condominium
Law, and Mortgage Bank and contract savings legislation. 18 7 USAID
also assisted in the initiation of an effective bank regulatory and supervi188
sory system.
USAID also focused its early efforts on assisting new, inexperienced,
local political leadership with the transition to transparent and accountable governance through the strengthening of fiscal and managerial capabilities of local governments and local non-government institutions.189
179. Tumenova, supra note 55, at 793.
180. Id. at 772.
181. Id. at 793.
182. Smith, supra note 96, at 323.
183. See, e.g., C. J. Chivers, Bush in Europe: Summing Up; What About Democracy?
Leaders Mute Differences, Latching on to the Affirmative, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at
A10 (noting American disquiet at President Vladimir Putin's apparent retreat from democracy and American concerns about property rights in light of the Yukos takeover).
184. KOPSTEIN, supra note 144, at 23 (quoting URBAN INSTITUTE, ASSESSMENT OF
RHUDO/WARSAW AHOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 1992-1995 iii (July 1995).
185. Id. at 23-24.
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3.

Georgia

The USAID strategic plan for Georgia for 1996 to 2000 mentioned land
reform as a high priority for the Georgian government. In the introduction, USAID states that "[t]here is a unique opportunity to build a market-based, and democratic society grounded in the rule of law and private
property if Georgia decentralizes economic and political power and
privatizes its agricultural resources, industrial capacity, and
infrastructure." 190
For Georgia to move towards a market-based society, many steps
needed to be taken in regard to private property rights. The Government
needed to work to create an integrated economic, legal, and regulatory
framework to stimulate private sector investment and growth, to encourage comprehensive private financial markets, and to establish private
land, both agricultural and urban, that could be freely bought and sold. 191
a.

Land Ownership

One of USAID's primary activities in Georgia during this period focused on the rapid creation of a land market. 192 USAID advocated and
assisted Georgian officials in working to implement a clear, simple, and
193
legally sound land registration system as a way of creating this market.
This system developed around two main categories of194land: agricultural
land and non-agricultural (urban and industrial) land.
Agricultural land privatization began in Georgia almost immediately
after it gained independence in 1992.195 As of 2000, approximately one
96
million Georgians had privatized three million agricultural parcels.'
Despite a successful privatization plan, there was no movement on land
registration rights and the old system did not meet the requirements of
the new privatization laws. 197 After analysis, the government initiated a
USAID supported agricultural land registration program in 1999 by presidential order. Some key points included:
" An initial land registration that is free of charge for farmers, increasing interest in registering rights to land;
" Local private companies and private entities conducted initial registration, simplifying the registration process;
" An initial registration process that is comprehensible for farmers
and free of useless bureaucratic steps;
190. USAID,
(1996).
191. Id.
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192. Arsenashvili, supra note 147, at 1-2.

193. Id. at 2.
194. Id. at 1.

195. Id.
196. Id.

197. Id.
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" An initial registration of land parcels permitting the recording of
land transactions subsequent to privatization at the time of
registration;
" An initial registration process that is transparent and
all interested
198
persons have access to the information they seek.
The initial registration system was inexpensive and effective. 199 Since
1999, almost one million parcels of agricultural land have been registered
and subsequent transactions have been held on tens of thousands of these
parcels. 2° Thus, one of the problems in the privatization process in
Georgia was solved at minimal cost by creating a simple process enacted
in large part by local authorities as opposed to setting up a large central
20 1
bureaucracy.
In the Georgian civil code, non-agricultural land includes urban and
industrial land. 20 2 Although land reform started with agricultural land,
the privatization of urban and industrial land began in 1997 and has been
largely successful. 20 3 The success, in part, had been attributed to the fact
that, like the agricultural land registration process, the privatization of
non-agricultural land was designed to be as simple and cost effective as
possible. 2°4 First, the privatization process effectively utilized existing
documentation and was molded into the existing government structure in
order to avoid creating useless bureaucratic steps. 20 5 The process established with these concerns in mind was transparent-accurate in the recording of rights, affordable, and responsive to the market-as opposed
to the being limited to the land boundaries and usage that was established
20 6
under the communist state.
4. Kosovo
Unlike the many of the other countries that arose out of the fall of the
Soviet Union's influence in Eastern Europe, Kosovo experienced several
years of civil war and ethnic discrimination following the end of socialist
rule in Yugoslavia. 20 7 Land reform, therefore, did not begin until after
the conflicts in 1999.208 At that point, the land ownership and registration system was in a state of confusion due to the rapidly changing political system. 20 9 In the preceding years, the legal framework concerning
property rights was questioned, canceled, and revised several times. 210 In
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2.

202. Id.

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.

206. Id. at 3.
207.

DAVID

STANFIELD ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY

FINAL REPORT 4 (2004).

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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369

addition, the conflicts damaged much of the land records as well as the
property itself. 21 ' USAID has proposed a way in which it can provide
assistance to correct the lack of clear and recorded property rights that
2 12
has been limiting economic development.
a.

Legal Framework

USAID's recommendations revolve around improving the legal framework supporting property rights.2 13 The current legal framework is rife
with gaps and uncertainty.2 14 The government needs to fill these gaps
and bolster the current laws supporting private ownership and the land
market.2 15 New legislation should amend current laws and establish new
2 16
regulations that allow the land market to develop and work efficiently.
For example, one such provision that inhibis development is a current
provision that gives municipalities and agricultural socially owned enterprises the "right of first refusal" that requires their approval for the sale
2 17
of land.
To implement and uphold these laws, USAID wants to develop guidance for legal professionals, judges, and institutions involved in upholding property rights.2 18 Such support will help to ensure even, consistent,
and fair application of property rights.2 19 This will help restore the public's knowledge and confidence that their rights will be protected; and,
220
they can, therefore, rely upon them in their actions.
b. Land Administration
USAID is also working to support municipalities' administration of
land and harmonize this with land administration programs of other
countries in the region. 221 This will allow local municipalities to inventory property ownership and provide a basis for the assignment of socially
owned property. 22 2 Staff must also be established and trained in the op223
eration of a new immovable property rights registration system.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
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Id.
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THE WEAKENING STRANDS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

AMERICAN RIGHTS, PROPERTY, AND LOCKEAN VALUES

In the United States, the generation of the Framers did not have to
create a theory of property rights anew, but were able to draw upon a
great source of intellectual and political capital. They regarded liberty
'224
and property as part and parcel of the historic "rights of Englishmen.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 had affirmed that even the King was
subject to the rule of law. The writers of the English and Scottish Enlightenment realized that government was a compact among individuals
for the preservation of their liberties-an idea important to the success of
the Glorious Revolution. John Locke was the best known of these authors to eighteenth century Americans. It was Locke's Second Treatise of
Government that declared: "Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I call by
the general Name, Property. '225 James Madison rephrased this as: "As a
man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have
a property in his rights. ' 226 According to a leading historian of the Revolutionary period, "By the late eighteenth century, 'Lockean' ideas of government and revolution were accepted everywhere in America; they
seemed, in fact, a statement of principles built into English constitutional
tradition." 227 As John Adams, who as president had appointed Chief Justice Marshall, declared, "Property must be secured or liberty cannot
exist. "228
During recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has, from time to time,
recognized the centrality of property rights to individual liberty. In Dolan v. City of Tigard,229 the Court declared that "[w]e see no reason why
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of
Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation. '230 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 231 the Court referred
for first time to the "Armstrong principle" of fairness. 2 32 In Armstrong v.
United States, it noted that the Takings Clause was "designed to bar Govermnent from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. '233 Never224. FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 12-13 (1985).
225.

LOCKE, supra note 19, at 350.
Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 4 LETTERS

226. James

AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 478 (1867).
227. PAIILINF MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DEC.LARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

228.

1850).
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

87 (1997).

6 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,

512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Id. at 392.
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
Id. at 321.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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theless, the tenuous status of private property rights in the United States
contrasts sharply with the clear articulation of the importance of such
rights so cogently articulated to Eastern European nations.
B.
1.

THE TEMPTATION TO SUBSUME PROPERTY IN REGULATION

The Growth of the Regulatory State

In the broadest sense, the weakening of the fabric of American property rights is concomitant with the rise of the regulatory state. During the
early decades of the twentieth century, the Progressive Movement developed the theme that the application of expertise to human affairs could
alleviate all manner of economic and social ills. Progressivism, as manifested in the New Deal, spawned massive administrative bureaucracies
and numerous regulations in fields such as commerce, housing, labor, and
permissible land uses. 234 This new regulatory landscape profoundly
changed many aspects of the legal system.2 35 The great branches of the
common law, which provided a framework for private ordering, were particularly affected.2 3 6 Tort law, previously emphasizing the rectification of
wrong done against one person by another, became infused with notions
of strict liability regardless of fault. 237 The traditional content of contract
law, previously content with providing a framework for consensual dealing among individuals, became partially supplanted by such vague regulatory doctrines as unconscionability and fair dealing.2 38 Property law was,
perhaps, most vulnerable to change. Unlike contract rights, which are
negotiated among individuals and generally binding upon only them and
those with whom they are in privity, property rights are applicable against
the world. 239 To be apparent to strangers, property rights must possess
clear-cut definitions and bright-line boundaries. 240
234. For expositions of the increased scope of government since the New Deal, see e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447-48

(1987) (noting that the New Deal "altered the constitutional system in ways so fundamental as to suggest that something akin to a constitutional amendment had taken place"); 1
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 44 (1991); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS passim (1938).
235. Sunstein, supra note 234, at 447-48.
236. Id. at 448.
237. See, e.g., Martin A. Kotler, Reconceptualizing Strict Liability in Tort: An Overview,
50 VAND. L. REV. 555. 560 (1997) (stating "today the adoption of an approach that imposes liability regardless of conduct normally represents an instrumentalist view of tort.
Liability is imposed to further some policy unrelated to the parties' behavior. As such,
strict liability may be viewed as a cost allocation system intended to achieve various goals,
such as wealth redistribution, efficiency, autonomy, and so on.") (footnote omitted).
238. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (Vt. 1984) (articulating that the
"implied warranty of habitability," a requirement for landlords to keep premises habitable,
is in fact based on the police power but elaborately based on ostensible (but nonwaivable)
implications of contract).
239. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 777 (2001).

240. Id. at 777 (elaborating the nature and consequences of contract rights being in
personam in nature and property rights being in rem).
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Attenuation of Property Rights in Land Use

Perhaps nowhere have property rights in the United States been so
eroded as in the area of land use. The basic rights of landowners-to use,
to exclude others, and to convey their rights to others-all have been
under assault. 241 In many respects, American real property has become
governed by a land use regime that, as in contemporary England, recognizes ownership rights only in uses to which land is currently put and
242
vests all other development rights in the State.

The right of alienation was directly attacked by the federal government

in such cases as Hodel v. Irving2 4 3 and Babbitt v. Youpee, 244 in which the

Supreme Court struck down repeated prohibitions on the transfer at
death of fractional interests in land. In a more subtle way, concepts such
as "reasonable investment backed expectations ' '245 may diminish the
transfer of property rights to successors.2 46 Misplaced equitable doctrines, such as the rule in place in some states disqualifying the purchaser
of land from seeking a variance on the grounds of "self-imposed hardship" even though the seller would have qualified,2 47 depart from the
traditional rule that a buyer acquires all of the rights that the seller
possessed.

248

The right to exclude others, although described by the Supreme Court
as "so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, ' 249 nevertheless has been abrogated in many regulatory contexts,
241. A general example is the revolution in landlord-tenant law, in which the lease,
used at common law primarily to convey an estate in land, has become regarded as a heavily-regulated contract. See generally Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential
Landlord-TenantLaw: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 516 (1984).
242. See Saxer, infra notes 327, 329, and associated text.
243. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
244. 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
245. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
246. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), the Court held that the promulgation of a regulation prior to acquisition did not deprive the purchaser of the right to raise
a takings claim. Id. at 626-30. However, Justice O'Connor, who supplied the fifth vote,
added that the Court's holding "does not mean that the timing of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial." Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
247. See, e.g., Clark v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 92 N.E.2d 903, 903 (N.Y. 1950) (declaring "one who thus knowingly acquires land for a prohibited use, cannot thereafter have a
variance on the ground of 'special hardship"'). The facts were otherwise egregious, and
the court did not explain why plaintiff's status as a purchaser was germane. For elaboration, see Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating From the "Rule
of Law", 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 345, 363-65 (1998).
248. See, e.g., Blackman v. Striker, 37 N.E. 484, 485 (N.Y. 1894) (stating "[t]he deed
must be held to convey all the interest in the lands which the grantor had, unless the intent
to pass a less estate or interest appears by express terms or be necessarily implied in the
terms of the grant.").
249. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979) (holding "we hold that
the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation").
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such as prohibitions on discrimination, 250 solicitude for low-income workers, 251 and "expressive" rights for those wanting to mount their
soapboxes in private shopping centers. 25 2 These, and similar ways in
which the right to exclude others, the classic manifestation 253 of the "negative liberty" to be left undisturbed, have been breached to enhance the
"positive liberty" actualizing the goals of some at the expense of
254
others.
Of all types of regulation of property in land, probably the most damaging to the rule of law has been the rise of comprehensive regulation of
land use. The earliest comprehensive zoning regulation, in New York
City in 1916, was instituted at the behest of Fifth Avenue merchants desirous of protecting their carriage trade clientele from contact with teeming
southern and eastern European immigrants working in new high-rise loft
factories. 255 The articulation of the need for zoning, however, was
framed in terms of Progressive era expertise:
The early enthusiasts for zoning ...were fighting a holy war against
the libertarian sins of nineteenth-century development .... Control

over land use would be removed from the amoral hand of the market
and entrusted to expert elites removed from politics and
business ....

In part, advocates have
significance of planning
other natural resources,
in their social
utility,
256
separated.

sought to downplay the social and political
by arguing that planning controls land and
not people. But the value of resources lies
so man and land cannot be so neatly

In 1926, comprehensive zoning received the Supreme Court's imprimatur in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.25 7 Justice George
Sutherland, writing for the Court, framed the issue as the validity of zoning restrictions "excluding from residential districts apartment houses,
business houses, retail stores and shops, and other like establish250. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations.).
251. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (holding farmer's trespass claims
subordinate to right of legal services attorneys to make unsolicited visits to farm laborers).
252. The Supreme Court has held that there is no First Amendment right to expressive
activity in private shopping centers. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972).
However, it subsequently ruled that states may impose private expressive conduct on shopping center owners without violating the owners' property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or free speech rights under the First Amendment. PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-88 (1980).
253. One famous definition reads: "[tihat is property to which the following label can
be attached. To the world: Keep off unless you have my permission, which I may grant or
withhold. Signed: Private Citizen. Endorsed: The state." Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 374 (1954).
254. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122-

34 (1969) (discussing positive and negative liberty).
255. See generally SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 173, 180 (1969).
256. DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING
THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 21 (1993).
257. 272 U.S. 365, 379-84 (1926).
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ments. '2 58 Any nonresidential uses in residential areas, including apartment houses, might result in fire, contagion, or disorder.2 59 Sutherland's
particular bate noire was apartment houses, which he pronounced to
"come very near to being nuisances. '260 Their presence in single-family
house neighborhoods, he added, "has sometimes resulted in destroying
the entire section for private house purposes .

.

. [, and] very often the

apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the resi'2 6 1
dential character of the district.
While some recent decisions decry "exclusionary zoning," 262 American
land use regulation was at the outset a "less than holy alliance between
zoning... and anti-immigration sentiment. 2' 63 It always has had a substantial class-based component. Indeed, as the trial court's opinion in Euclid declared, the ultimate purpose of zoning was "to classify the
population
and segregate them according to their income or situation in
2 64
life."

3.

Expansion of the Power of Eminent Domain

Government entities increasingly have used condemnation for purposes far removed from alleviation of blight or the more traditional construction of government buildings and facilities used by the public.
Eminent domain "has become a marketing tool for governments seeking
'2 65
to lure bigger business.
In its two seminal cases on what constituted "public use" under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,2 66 the Supreme Court accorded
great latitude to localities seeking to condemn land for retransfer to private owners. In Berman v. Parker,267 the Court adjudicated the condemnation of a sound parcel located within a blighted neighborhood that was
undergoing comprehensive redevelopment. The Court held that the redevelopment of slums was within the "broad and inclusive" concept of
public welfare. 268 "Once the question of the public purpose has been de258. Id. at 390.
259. Id. at 391.
260. Id. at 394-95. This was dicta on a grand scale. Ambler Realty Co. wanted to use
its land for heavy industry, and its facial attack on zoning in no way implicated single
family homes or apartment buildings. Id.

261. Id. at 394.

262. See, e.g., S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975) (imposing obligation to provide fair-share of regional low- and moderate-income housing needs on developing municipalities).
263. Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 252, 257 (Charles M. Harr & Jerold S. Kayden eds., !989.
264. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
265. Dean Starkman, Take and Give: Condemnation Is Used to Hand One Business
Property of Another, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
266. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
267. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
268. Id. at 33.
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cided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and
the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the
discretion of the legislative branch. ' 269 Furthermore, "community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a
piecemeal basis-lot by lot, building by building. '2 70 In Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, the Court similarly upheld the condemnation of
freehold interests for transfer to the respective ground lessees for the purpose of "reduc[ing] the perceived social and economic evils of a land oli'2 71
gopoly traceable to their monarchs."
Both cases effusively deferred to legislative determinations. Berman
declared that "[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive. '2 72 Midkiff added, rather confusingly, that the Public Use Clause is "coterminous" with the police power. 273 More generally, the Court, in both cases, distinguished the incidental private gain
that would result from condemnation and retransfer to achieve a valid
public purpose from the "purely private taking ... [that] would serve no
274
legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void."
Even in areas where the permissibility of condemnation for retransfer
clearly is established, the inherent vagueness of definitions gives rise to
the possibility of abuse. In Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v.
Mayor & Council of Borough of Princeton, for instance, a New Jersey
appellate court recently determined that the designation of an "area in
need of redevelopment" (i.e., a blighted area) could be premised on functional obsolescence. 2 75 The "faulty design" in question was that of a municipal parking lot in an affluent community that was condemned by the
269. Id. at 35-36.
270. Id. at 35. "The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan
could be developed for the region, including not only new homes but also schools,
churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers. In this way it was hoped that the cycle of
decay of the area could be controlled and the birth of future slums prevented." Id. at 34-

35.
271. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984). The Court noted findings that the State and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State's land and
that another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners. Id. at 232.
272. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
273. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. "This pronouncement has dismayed commentators because the outer limit of the police power has traditionally marked the line between noncompensable regulation and compensable takings of property, not the line between

compensable takings and the area where the constitution bars government from engaging
in any sort of exchange whatever. Legitimately exercised, the police power requires no
compensation. Thus, if public use is truly coterminous with the police power, a state could
freely choose between compensation and noncompensation any time its actions served a
'public use.' This approach would seemingly overrule the entire takings doctrine in a single
stroke." Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 70
(1986).
274. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34 (stating "[t]he public
end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a
department of government.").
275. Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Council of Borough of Princeton, 851
A.2d 685, 702-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
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borough in which it was located. 276 The borough sought to ease parking
277
problems in downtown Princeton and deemed the lot ill-configured.
Likewise, in City of Norwood v. Homey, a municipality had designated a
formerly all-residential neighborhood that more recently had some commercial development as "deteriorating," so that homes could be condemned for an additional commercial project.2 78 The city code defined a
"deteriorating" area as:
An area, whether predominantly built up or open, which is not a
slum, blighted or deteriorated area, but which because of incompatible land uses, nonconforming uses, lack of adequate facilities, faulty
street arrangement, obsolete platting, inadequate community and
public utilities, diversity of ownership, tax delinquency, increased
density of population without commensurate increases in new residential buildings and community facilities, high turnover in residential or commercial occupancy, lack of maintenance and repair of
buildings, or any combination thereof, is detrimental to the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare, and which will
deteriorate
279
or is in danger of deteriorating, into a blighted area.

Under this definition, a slippery slope is created by which neighborhoods deemed ripe for conversion by developers are determined to be
less-than-ideal by local officials, hence in danger of becoming blighted,
and thus treated as if they were blighted. Under these elastic standards,
the appellate court in Horney found that the city had not abused its dis281
cretion.280 The Supreme Court of Ohio recently granted review.
A glaring example of the pretextual invocation of "blight" was 99 Cents
Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, where a "big-box" retailer important to local redevelopment efforts leaned on the city to condemn a competitor's store for retransfer to it.2 8 2 Also, in Aaron v. Target
Corp., in which a large retailer, desirous of expanding a successful store,
circumvented negotiating with its landlord by paying for a blight study
which found minor problems that, in fact, were the retailer's responsibility under the lease. 283 Furthermore, the retailer had process served upon

itself as agent for the landlord, which learned of the condemnation too
late.2 84 The U.S. District Court declared Aaron to be "one of the rare

cases inwhich possible 'bad faith, harassment, or some extraordinary circumstance' makes abstention inappropriate. '285 On this point it was re276. Id. at 703.
277. Id.
278. City of Norwood v. Horney, 830 N.E.2d 381, 384-86 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2005).
279. Id. at 388.
280. id. at 390.
281. 828 N.E.2d 115 (May 25, 2005) (table).
282. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126-27
(C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003).
283. Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167-68 (E.D. Mo. 2003), rev'd, 357
F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2004).
284. Id. at 1168.
285. Id. at 1172 (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982)).
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versed, with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holding that
286
the trial court should have exercised Younger abstention.
In Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., the Supreme Court of Illinois found that the
redeveloping agency condemning the landowner's parcel did not undertake an independent study or formulate a comprehensive plan, but instead "advertised that, for a fee, it would condemn land at the request of
'private developers' for the 'private use' of developers. 2 87 The court
concluded that the agency's "true intentions were to act as a default bro'2 88
ker of land.
A case raising the generic economic condemnation issue perhaps most
starkly is Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment
Agency. 289 There, the locality desired to obtain sales tax revenues that
would flow from a "big-box" store to be located on the church's large,
commercially-zoned lot fronting a main road, instead of the large auditorium and ministry buildings that the plaintiff had planned for. 290 The city
denied the church's development application and its redevelopment
agency instituted condemnation proceedings on the grounds of ostensibly
blight. 29 1 Given the nature of the landowner's intended use, the court
applied heightened scrutiny to the denial under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, as opposed to rational basis
review. 2 92 The court quoted 99 Cents Only Stores' observation that the
"condemnation efforts rested on nothing more than the desire to achieve
the naked transfer of property from one private party to another," and
added "[t]hat appears to be the case here. '293 "The court's skepticism of
the city's explanations provides support that courts are becoming increasingly critical of public use justifications. ' 294
A very significant response to condemnation abuse was the Michigan
Supreme Court's 2004 decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.295 The
court abrogated its seminal, well-known, and very deferential Poletown
286. Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768,774-75, 780 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that, although condemnation proceedings were not commenced in state court until almost two
weeks after federal injunctive relief was sought, steps proceeding formal condemnation
had been well underway); see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971) (holding that
federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases where equitable relief
would interfere with pending state proceedings in a way that offends principles of comity
and federalism).
287. Southwestern I11.Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl. LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. 2002).
288. Id.

289. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
290. Id. at 1209.
291. Id. at 1213-15, 1227.
292. Id. at 1219-20.
293. Id. at 1229 (quoting 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F.
Supp. 2d at 1129).
294. Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings
Clause and the Erosion of the "Public Use" Requirement, 87 MINN. L. Rnv. 543, 554 (2002).

295. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
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doctrine, 296 under which an entire ethnic neighborhood had been leveled
for construction of a new General Motors assembly plant. Hathcock reviewed the history of the term "public use" under the Michigan constitution and concluded that "the transfer of condemned property is a 'pubic
use' when it possesses one of the three characteristics in our pre-1963
case law identified by Justice Ryan" in his Poletown dissent:
First, condemnations in which private land was constitutionally transferred by the condemning authority to a private entity involved
"public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable. '297
Second, this Court has found that the transfer of condemned property to a private entity is consistent with the constitution's "public
use" requirement when the private298entity remains accountable to the
public in its use of that property.
Finally, condemned land may be transferred to a private entity when
the selection of the land to be condemned is itself based on public
concern. In Justice Ryan's words, the property must be selected on
the basis of "facts of independent public significance," meaning that
the underlying purposes for resorting to condemnation, rather than
the subsequent use of condemned
land, must satisfy the Constitu299
tion's public use requirement.
The first of these tests would seem to cover railways, pipelines, and
other uses where holdouts could stymie acquisition of an unbroken right
of way. The third test would cover elimination of blight, which would
occur prior to the land's redevelopment. The troublesome aspect of the
second test, remaining accountability, is that it will have a tendency to
involve the State more closely with private enterprise. While real covenants designating broadly appropriate uses of land would prevent some
abuse, the need of ongoing business for flexibility in their operations
would make public bodies more their business partners than their
regulators.
4.

The Supreme Court Endorses Condemnationfor Private
Redevelopment in Kelo

In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court recently explicated
the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause. 3°° In a 5-4 decision, it upheld
the condemnation of private homes in a non-blighted neighborhood for
the purpose of private economic redevelopment of a distressed commu296. Id. at 770; see Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
497 (Mich. 1981).
297. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J.
dissenting)).
298. Id. at 782 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 479 (Ryan, J. dissenting)).
299. Id. at 782-83 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J. dissenting)).
300. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005); see U.S. CONST., amend.
V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
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nity.301 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, asserted that "public purpose" has morphed to subsume "public use," 30 2 and that the
revitalization project, which would create offices, shops, and high-end
housing adjacent to the Pfizer Corporation's new world research center,
served a public purpose. 303 Justice O'Connor's principal dissent complained that, in both Berman and Midkiff, "the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on
society. ' 30 4 In contrast, Kelo "holds that the sovereign may take private
property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new,
ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some
secondary benefit for the public-such as increased tax revenue, more
jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure. '30 5 Furthermore, "[t]he specter of
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State
from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shop30 6
ping mall, or any farm with a factory.1

A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, whose vote was necessary to
Justice Stevens' majority, stressed that heightened scrutiny would be required in judging condemnations for retransfer to other private parties
under some unspecified circumstances. 307 In any event, the presence or
absence of a comprehensive redevelopment plan or explicit quid pro quo
involving the redeveloper is essentially irrelevant. The success of attempts to lure desirable new commercial activity to a city largely is a
function of the city's reputation in pleasing firms that previously relocated there. 30 8 As Justice O'Connor noted, in economic development
takings, "private benefit and incidental public benefit are, by definition,
merged and mutually reinforcing. In this case, for example, any boon for
Pfizer or the plan's developer is difficult to disaggregate from the promised public gains in taxes and jobs.

' 30 9

While Justice Stevens acknowledged such "aberrations" as 99 Cents
Only Stores, it was in the context of noting that the Court would confront
potential abuses "if and when they arise. '310 Given that the Supreme
Court did not hear a public use case during the twenty years preceding
Kelo and that it might hear perhaps one takings case per year of any type,
301.
302.
dorsed
eroded
303.
304.

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
Id. at 2662 (asserting that "while many state courts in the mid-19th century en'use by the public' as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily
over time").
Id. at 2665.
Id. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Berman involved urban blight

and Midkiff addressed oligopoly).

305. Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-447, 450 (1985)).
308. See Steven J. Eagle, Kelo v. City of New London: A Tale of PragmatismBetrayed,
in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: Kelo in Context (Dwight Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross, eds., 2006).
309. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675-76.
310. Id. at 2667, n.17.
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it is unlikely that the Court will exercise direct supervision. Furthermore,
its holdings make review of state or local regulatory takings cases by
3 11
lower federal courts most improbable, as well.
Even if a private enterprise is designated as the recipient of a postcondemnation retransfer, it has no assurance of retaining its new estate.
In what might seem to the original landowner an act of poetic justice, the
locality might condemn the interest a second time and transfer it to a
different private developer. In that case, the cry of the first developer
that its interest is inviolate because the transfer to it had been determined
to be in the public interest is of no avail. 3 12 The upshot is that private
redevelopers, as much as cities, must engage in eternal market-based
courtship of those with the power to affect their destinies.
5.

Smart Growth

Although many urbanites find it de rigueurto condemn suburban living
and "sprawl," "Americans have a strong preference for detached singlefamily homes on relatively large lots, whether a log cabin in the woods, a
garden cottage in the suburbs, or a four thousand square foot 'McMansion' on an acre of land. ' 313 Furthermore, given the cost of land and
building materials, "[f]ar more Americans than Europeans can afford this
4
form of low-density housing.

'31

"Sprawl" is the ogre of land use and urban policy at the turn of the
new century. While fostering suburbia was once a guiding principle,
suburban "sprawl" is now blamed for a spectrum of harms, from environmental disasters such as the depletion of wilderness and the
pollution of water, to urban maladies such as the creation of the ethnic underclass and the prostration of city governments. Without too
much exaggeration, there would seem to be no greater issue of social
policy ....315
As a "solution" to the sprawl problem, experts have proposed "smart
growth," the tools of which include "use restrictions, environmental requirements, economic incentives, conditional demands, and regulatory
mechanisms to secure participation by landowners and developers in
311. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
186 (1985) (positing need for property owner to litigate for compensation through state
courts before claim "ripe" for federal judicial review); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty.
of San Francisco, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 2501 (2005) (holding that full faith and credit act precludes federal court review of issues determined in state ripening litigation). In San Remo
Hotel, L.P., four justices noted that the Williamson County "state litigation" requirement
should be reconsidered. 125 S.Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
312. See Kaufmann's Carousel. Inc. v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 750
N.Y.S.2d 212, 221 (App. Div. 2002) (finding "no merit" to the contention that "the power
to condemn does not extend to property that is already devoted to a public purpose").
313. Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management and Sustainable Development in the United States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New Middle Landscape,
11 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 26, 32 (2003).
314. Id.
315. Paul J. Boudreaux, Looking the Ogre in the Eye: Ten Tough Questionsfor the Antisprawl Movement, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 172 (2000).
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combating urban sprawl."' 3 16 The American Planning Association's "Policy Guide on Smart Growth" recently stated as a "core principle" that
"[e]very level of government-federal, state, regional, county, and local-should identify policies and practices that are inconsistent with
Smart Growth and develop new policies and practices that support Smart
Growth. ' 317 The APA also calls for statewide planning, 3 18 and the number of "smart growth" statutes in place has increased dramatically. Hawaii, Vermont, Florida, and Oregon were among the first states to
3 19
implement planning on a statewide basis during the 1960s and '70s.
Other states adopting statewide planning initiatives since include New
320
Jersey, Washington, Maryland, California, and Florida.
It is too early to tell the ultimate impact of the "smart growth" movement. However, it is very likely that such measures as the urban growth
32 1
boundary system in Portland, Oregon, does result in higher prices.
Voters in Oregon attempted to amend the state constitution to protect
private property rights 322 and subsequently did so by statutory initiative. 323 The 324
State's stringent land use controls played a critical role in
their actions.
A recent study of the housing markets in more than 300 American cities since 1950 notes that, since 1970, the primary cause of increase in
housing prices appears to be "a significant increase in the ability of local
residents to block new projects and a change of cities from urban growth
machines to homeowners' cooperatives. ' 32 5 A related study of housing
316. James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits on Government
Powers: Effecting Nature, Markets, and the Quality of Life Under the Takings and Other
Provisions, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 421, 455-456 (2001).
317. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, POLICY GUIDE ON SMART GROWTH 1 (April
15, 2004) [hereinafter APA POLICY GUIDE], available at http://www.planning.org/policy
guides/smartgrowth.htm.

318. Id. at 5.
319. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 771 (4th ed.
2004).
320. For brief summaries of these and other statutes, see ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM
SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 209-252 (1999).

321. See William A. Fischel, Comment on Anthony Downs's "Have Housing Prices
Risen Faster in Portland Than Elsewhere?", 13 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 43, 44 (2002),
available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd-1301-fischel.pdf.
322. In November 2000, the voters of Oregon passed "Initiative Measure 7," which provided that the state or a political subdivision must pay just compensation equal to the full
reduction in value caused by the enforcement of a regulation that adopted after the owner
has purchased the private real property in question. Id. The Amendment was invalidated
under the state's "one subject" rule. League of Or. Cities v. State, 56 P.3d 892, 892-96 (Or.

2002).
323. See OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE, MEASURE 37, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_text.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
324. See Sara C. Galvan, Comment, Gone Too Far: Oregon's Measure 37 and the Perils
of Over-Regulating Land Use, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 587 (2005). But see Edward J.
Sullivan, Oregon's Measure 37: Crisis and Opportunityfor Planning,57 PLAN. & ENVTL.L.
3 (2005) (attributing passage to "clever political stroke").
325. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up? (Harv. Inst. of
Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2061 (2005), available at http://post.economics.
harvard.edu/hier/2005papers/2005list.html (forthcoming in the AMER. ECON. REV.).
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prices in Manhattan also indicates that supply restrictions lead to high
326
prices.
More important, "smart growth" inevitably would pull the United
States closer to the present English system, where the right to develop
land was "severely impacted" by the Town and Country Planning Act of
1947.327 The law vested all rights, other than those to which the land was
currently being put, in the State. 328 It "did not nationalise the land; what
329
it did do was to nationalise the development value in land."
C.

CREATIVE RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS

Even where the amount of a resource available for use has to be
capped, there is no reason why fractional shares could not be distributed
to the affected landowners. In nations with a rough transition to the rule
of law and a market economy, mistrust of government might make this
not work too well. 330 In the United States, such an approach was
adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Barancik v.
County of Marin.331 That case concerned the sparsely developed Nicasio
Valley, a rugged and beautiful area in Northern California. 332 Rather
than zoning individual parcels for development at commercially infeasible levels or limiting development to landowners elsewhere who were
awarded "transfer development rights" in mitigation of stringent restrictions on land use on their own parcels that might otherwise constitute
takings, 333 to award individual landowners, the county provided for
"Transfer of Development Rights" in the still sparsely developed valley.
The plan treated what the court later termed the "homogeneous community of Nicasio Valley," as "one complete land forum, one large property
to be sensitively planned. ' 334 Ranchers in the valley were permitted "to
sell to other property owners in the valley the right to develop within the
326. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise

in House Prices (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W10124 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=471474.
327. Shelley Ross Saxer, Planning Gain, Exactions, and Impact Fees: A Comparative
Study of Planning Law in England, Wales, and the United States, 32 URB. LAW. 21, 37

(2000).

328. Id.
329. Id. at 37 n.98 (quoting SIR DESMOND HEAP, AN OUTLINE OF PLANNING LAW 14
(11th ed. 1996)).
330. See, e.g., Yuliya Mitrofanskaya, Privatizationas an InternationalPhenomenon:Ka-

zakhstan, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1399, 1415 (1999) (noting that Russian citizens often
sold their tradable share certificates in newly denationalized industries for a pittance,
partly because of mistrust of subsequent government policies).
331. 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1989).
332. Id. at 835.
333. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y.
1976) (approving TDRs in theory, although striking down the statute at bar as requiring
landowners to accept TDRs with market values too uncertain and contingent to comport
with due process). But see R. S. Radford, Takings and Transferable Development Rights in
the Supreme Court: The ConstitutionalStatus of TDRs in the Aftermath of Suitum, 28 STETSON L. REV. 685, 688 (1999) (expressing concern that TDRs may be used as device to
circumvent liability for regulatory takings).
334. Barancik, 872 F.2d at 835.
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regulations of the community. A purchaser could accumulate more than
335
one development right."
One impetus for recognition of such rights in the future is the disquiet
that some Supreme Court justices have expressed in Kelo v. City of New
London336 regarding the failure of landowners whose land has been
taken for private revitalization to receive any of the great additional
value that
inures when small parcels are assembled into one larger
7
parcel.

33

IV. CONCLUSION
Both United States Government agencies and private organizations
have been working to acquaint Eastern European nations with the flexibility and other advantages of private property rights. Creative preservation of those rights at home in America would offer similar advantages.
However, court decisions in the United States have undermined the private property rights of American citizens at home.
As Justice O'Connor ended her Kelo dissent: "As for the victims, the
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer
resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this
perverse result. '[T]hat alone is a just government,' wrote James
Madison, 'which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his
own.' "7338

335. Id. at 835.
336. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
337. See id. at 2668 n.21 (recognizing the issue as "important," but not raised in this
litigation). See also, Transcript of Oral Argument, Kelo v. City of New London, No. 04108, 2005 WL 529436 (Feb. 22, 2005). Justice Kennedy asked petitioner's counsel whether
there was legal scholarship pertaining to whether the Court ought "to adjust the measure
of compensation, so that the owner-the condemnee-can receive some sort of a premium
for the development? ...[M]aybe that compensation measure ought to be adjusted when
A is losing property for the economic benefit of B." Id. at *15-16.
338. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting) (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETrE, (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (R.

Rutland et al., eds., 1983).
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